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Abstract
Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and
iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have
been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is
determined by both the number of its successors, as in axiomatic methods, and the powers
of its successors, as in iterative methods. Contrary to other iterative methods, we obtain
a full ranking of the nodes for any digraph. The new power function, called the positional
power function, can either be determined as the unique solution to a system of equations, or
as the limit point of an iterative process. The solution is also explicitly characterized. This
characterization enables us to derive a number of interesting properties of the positional
power function. Next we consider a number of extensions, like the positional weakness
function and the position function.
JEL classication: C60, C70, D70
Key words: graph, tournament, power function
1 Introduction
Many economic and social situations can been modelled by means of a digraph. A digraph
is an irreexive directed graph consisting of a nite set N of nodes and a collection A
of ordered pairs of these nodes, called arcs or arrows, e.g. see Behzad, Chartrand and
Lesniak-Foster [1]. An arc from one node to another node represents a dominance relation
of the former node over the latter node. For instance, in a sports competition each node is
a player or team and an arc going from node i to node j means that player i has won a play
against player j, e.g. see Moon and Pullman [19], Rubinstein [22], and Laont, Laslier and
LeBreton [17]. Within an economic perspective, Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [11] and
van den Brink [4] model a hierarchical structure by a digraph. Within this framework the
nodes represent economic agents and an arc going from node i to node j means that agent
i has economic power over agent j, e.g. to set trading conditions. In social choice theory
the set of nodes represents the available alternatives. Then the problem is that several
individuals (voters) may have dierent, often conicting, preferences over the available
alternatives and that only one alternative can be implemented. The problem to choose the
most preferred alternative can be modelled as a digraph by assigning an arc from node i
to node j when in a pairwise comparison of the alternatives, alternative i is preferred to j
by a majority of the voters, see e.g. David [9], Sen [24], Kano and Sakamoto [14], and the
monograph of Laslier [18]. Although usually the individual preferences are transitive, in
general the resulting digraph does not reect a transitive ordering.
A digraph is a tournament when for any two dierent nodes i; j 2 N it holds
that either there is an arc from i to j or from j to i. Clearly, in a round-robin sports
competition the resulting digraph is a tournament when draws are not possible. Also the
digraph obtained from the majority voting in the social choice problem is a tournament
when for any pair of alternatives the majority voting is decisive, which will be certainly
true in case the number of voters is odd and all individual preferences are linear orders. In
this paper we consider the class of all digraphs, allowing for non-decisive majority voting
in case of social choice theory, an `open' competition (not requiring that every team meets
every other team exactly once), and any type of structure in a (hierarchical) organisation.
Moreover, while in social choice situations the decision maker is often only interested in
nding an optimal alternative, in a sports competition often not only the winner matters,
but one is usually also interested in ranking all the teams. Also in economic (hierarchical)
situations it may be important to have a measure of the strength or power of all the
nodes. In this paper our aim is to obtain such a full ranking of the nodes in any digraph
by measuring for every node the power being exercised directly or indirectly on all other
nodes.
To rank the nodes in a digraph, several methods have been proposed in the literature.
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Axiomatic ranking procedures were proposed for example by Sabidussi [23], Nieminen [21],
Behzad, Chartrand and Lesniak-Foster [1], Rubinstein [22], Bouyssou [3] , van den Brink
[4], and van den Brink and Gilles [6], [7]. An axiomatic procedure yields a unique function
f from the collection of all digraphs to the n-dimensional real space IR
n
, satisfying certain
axioms, where n is the number of nodes. For each digraph A, the value f
i
(A) of the i-th
component of f(A) 2 IR
n
can be seen as a measure of the power of node i within digraph A.
From the components of vector f(A) a ranking of the nodes in digraph A is obtained. In the
axiomatic approach the problem is to nd an independent system of axioms that uniquely
determines a function f on the class of all digraphs. Of course, the induced ranking f(A)
of the nodes in digraph A depends on the axioms to be satised. A well-known axiomatic
power function is the score function, in which the power of a node is equal to the number
of its successors.
Another class of ranking procedures are the so-called iterative solutions. This type
of methods goes back to Wei [26] and Kendall [16]. For a tournament these methods have
been discussed extensively in Laslier [18]. The method proposed by Wei [26], called the
`Long path method' by Laslier [18], iterates the score vector. In Moon and Pullman [19],
see also Keener [15], it is shown that only under restrictive assumptions on the digraph
A, this procedure converges to a non-zero vector. Other iterative procedures are the so-
called Markov solution proposed by e.g. Daniels [8], see also Laslier [18], and a procedure
proposed in Borm, van den Brink and Slikker [2], which is based on the axiomatic power
function of van den Brink [4]. All these procedures will be discussed more extensively in
Section 2. Here we only state that they all have some serious drawbacks. The Long path
method is only well-dened when the digraph satises very strong conditions. In particular
it must hold that each node must be dominated by at least one other node, excluding for
instance digraphs being hierarchies or trees or nodes being isolated. The Markov solution is
only well-dened on the class of tournaments, while the procedure of Borm, van den Brink
and Slikker [2] gives a unique outcome to any digraph, but has the disadvantage that it
only ranks the players in the top cycles.
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Although this property is often required in case
of the social choice problem of choosing a best alternative, it implies that the procedure
cannot be used to obtain a full ranking of all the nodes. Contrary to the axiomatic power
functions, the iterative methods measure the global power of nodes in a digraph.
Besides the axiomatic and iterative methods, alternative ranking methods have been
proposed by e.g. Slater [25] and Kano and Sakamoto [14]. Both these methods are based
on a concept of distance between the digraph and the rankings on the set of nodes. For
instance, in Kano and Sakamoto [14], the so-called backward length between the digraph
1
A set K of nodes is a top cycle of digraph A if for any two nodes i and j in K, there exists a sequence
i
1
; : : : ; i
`
of nodes such that i
1
= i, i
`
= j and (i
k
; i
k+1
) 2 A, k = 1; : : : ; `  1, and when for any i 2 K and
h 62 K it holds that (h; i) 62 A. Note that there may be multiple top cycles.
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and a ranking is minimized on the set of all rankings.
In this paper we propose a new method for measuring the power of the nodes in a
digraph. To do so, we rst show that all iterative solutions mentioned above can be obtained
as a (not necessarily unique) solution of a homogeneous system of linear equations. Then
we will formulate an alternative system of linear equations and it will be shown that this
system does not suer from the drawbacks of the iterative procedures mentioned above. In
particular, the system has a unique solution for any digraph and therefore the new method
is not restricted to a subclass of digraphs. Moreover, the solution vector gives zero power
to any dummy node and a positive power to any node that dominates at least one other
node, so that it does not only rank the nodes in the top cycles, but also the other nodes.
The motivation of the new power function is that the power of a node is determined by
both the number of its successors, as in the score measure, and the powers of its successors,
as is the case in the iterative methods.
We also introduce a weakness function on the collection of all digraphs, which mea-
sures the weakness of the nodes in a digraph, and a net power function. The latter function
measures the net power of any node in a digraph as the dierence between its power and
its weakness in the digraph and can be seen as the Copeland variant of the new power
function.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss both the axiomatic
solutions and the iterative methods and we show that the solutions generated by these latter
methods are eigenvectors of well-chosen systems of equations. In Section 3 we introduce
the new power function as the unique solution of a system of equations. Moreover we
discuss several properties of the new power function and show that the solution of the
system of equations can be seen as the limit point of an iterative process. In Section 4 we
propose the weakness function and the Copeland variant of the new power function, while
in Section 5 some further generalizations are discussed.
2 Power Functions on Digraphs
A directed graph consists of a set of nodes and a set of directed edges or arcs. The set of
nodes is denoted by N and consists of a nite number of n elements, indexed by i = 1; : : : ; n.
An arc points from some node i 2 N to some node j 2 N and is denoted by the ordered
pair (i; j). A directed graph on the set N of nodes is denoted by its set A of arcs, i.e.
A  N  N . If (i; j) 2 A we say that node i dominates node j. Node i 2 A is a dummy
node if it does not dominate any other node; node i 2 A is a top node if it dominates any
node that has at least one predecessor.
A directed graph is called irreexive if (i; i) 62 A for every i 2 N . An irreexive
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directed graph is shortly called a digraph. A digraph A is said to be a tournament if for
any two dierent nodes i; j 2 N it holds that either (i; j) 2 A or (j; i) 2 A. A digraph is
called to be transitive when for any three nodes i, j and h it holds that (i; h) 2 A when
both (i; j) 2 A and (j; h) 2 A. Clearly, when A is a transitive tournament then A reects
a linear order on the set of nodes. Finally, digraph A is called empty when A = ; and
complete when A = NN nf(i; i)j i 2 Ng. Throughout this paper A denotes the collection
of all digraphs on a given set N of n nodes, i.e. A is the collection of all irreexive directed
graphs on N .
A ranking or power function f on the collection A of digraphs on N assigns for
any A 2 A a real number to every node i in N , which can be seen as its strength, as
in a sports competition, its power, as in a digraph reecting a hierarchical structure, or
determining its rank, as in a digraph reecting preferences over a nite set of alternatives.
To facilitate the introduction of power functions, we rst dene for every node i 2 N its
sets of predecessors and successors in A by
P
A
i
= fj 2 N j(j; i) 2 Ag and S
A
i
= fj 2 N j(i; j) 2 Ag;
respectively, i.e. P
A
i
is the set of all nodes by which i is dominated in N and S
A
i
is the set
of all nodes in N dominated by i. We denote the cardinality of these sets by p
A
i
and s
A
i
,
respectively, i.e. p
A
i
= jP
A
i
j and s
A
i
= jS
A
i
j, i 2 N . Observe that when A is a tournament
we have for all i and all h 6= i that h belongs to either P
A
i
or S
A
i
, so that p
A
i
+ s
A
i
= n  1.
2.1 Axiomatic power functions
Two axiomatic power functions on the class A of all digraphs are, rst, the well-known
score function, see for instance Behzad, Chartrand and Lesniak-Foster [1], Delver, Monsuur
and Storcken [10] or Rubinstein [22], and second, the alternative dominance function, see
van den Brink [4] and van den Brink and Gilles [6], [7].
Denition 2.1 (Score and dominance functions)
(i) The score function is the function f
s
:A! IR
n
+
given by f
s
i
(A) = s
A
i
; i 2 N;A 2 A.
(ii) The dominance function is the function f
d
:A ! IR
n
+
given by f
d
i
(A) =
P
j2S
A
i
1
p
A
j
; i 2
N;A 2 A.
So, for any digraph A the score of a node i is equal to the number of nodes dominated by i,
i.e. the score is equal to the number of wins. The interpretation of the dominance function
is as follows. First, every node being dominated by at least one other node is given one
unit of power. Then, for every node this unit is equally distributed over all its predecessors.
Consequently, the power of node i is the sum of all the contributions obtained by i from
its successors. So, when i dominates node j and j is also dominated by k  1 other nodes,
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then the domination of j by i yields a contribution of
1
k
to the power of i. Both the score
and dominance function are uniquely dened by a number of properties.
A function f :A! IR
n
satises the dummy node property if for every A 2 A it holds
that f
i
(A) = 0 if s
A
i
= 0. Also, f satises top node property if for every A 2 A and for every
top node i 2 N , it holds that f
i
(A)  f
h
(A) for all h 2 N . The next property says that for
any independent partition of a digraph into subdigraphs the power of a node in the digraph
is equal to the sum of the powers of the node in each of the subdigraphs.
2
Formally, a
function f :A! IR
n
satises the additivity over independent partitions property if for every
A 2 A and for every independent partition D = fD
1
; : : : ; D
s
g of A into s subdigraphs
it holds that f
i
(A) =
P
s
k=1
f
i
(D
k
); i 2 N . The next characterization of the score and
dominance function has been given in van den Brink [4], see also van den Brink and Gilles
[7].
Theorem 2.2
(i) The score function f
s
:A! IR
n
+
is the only function f on A satisfying the dummy node
property, the top node property, the additivity over independent partitions property and the
normalization rule that the total power is equal to the number of arcs, i.e. for every A 2 A
it holds that
P
i2N
f
i
(A) = jAj.
(ii) The dominance function f
d
:A! IR
n
+
is the only function f on A satisfying the dummy
node property, the top node property, the additivity over independent partitions property
and the normalization rule that the total power is equal to the number of dominated nodes,
i.e. for every A 2 A it holds that
P
i2N
f
i
(A) =


fi 2 N j p
A
i
> 0g


.
The theorem implies that the score and dominance function are uniquely deter-
mined by the top and dummy node property, the property of additivity over independent
partitions and a normalization rule and only dier from each other because of the dierent
normalizations. In Rubinstein [22] a characterization of the ranking by the score function
has been given on the subclass of tournaments. In this case the ranking by the score func-
tion is the same as the ranking by the well-known Copeland score function, which assigns
to every node the dierence between the number of successors and the number of predeces-
sors. A characterization of this Copeland score has been given by Bouyssou [3]. For more
properties we refer to Behzad, Chartrand and Lesniak-Foster [1] for the score function and
to van den Brink and Gilles [6], [7] for the dominance function. In particular, both the
score function and dominance function share the symmetry property that f
i
(A) = f
h
(A)
if both P
A
i
= P
A
h
and S
A
i
= S
A
h
.
2
For a digraph A, a collection D = fD
1
; : : : ; D
s
g of s digraphs is called a partition of A if A = [
s
k=1
D
k
and D
k
\D
`
= ; for all k 6= `. A partition D = fD
1
; : : : ; D
s
g is called independent if for any i there is a
D
k
containing all arrows (j; i) in A:
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We conclude this subsection by mentioning that in van den Brink and Borm [5] the
dominance function has been modied to the function f
md
:A ! IR
n
+
given by f
md
i
(A) =
P
j2S
A
i
[fig
1
1+p
A
j
; i 2 N , i.e. in the modied dominance function each node distributes its
unit of measure equally over itself and all its predecessors. In fact, it is the dominance
function applied to the reexive graph
b
A induced by A, i.e.
b
A = A [ f(i; i)j i 2 Ng, and
thus satises that the total power is equal to the number of nodes. However, observe that
this modied dominance function does not satisfy the dummy node property on A.
2.2 Iterative procedures
The power assigned to a node according to an axiomatic function can be seen as the
power being directly exercised by a node in the digraph. For example, the score power
of a node only depends on its number of successors in the digraph, while the (modied)
dominance power of a node depends only on the number of predecessors of each of its
successors (including the node itself). Power functions obtained by iterative procedures,
however, can be seen as global measures because they also take into account how strong
these successors are and measure therefore also the indirect power exercised by a node.
First we consider the Long path method or iterated score vector, originated from Wei
[26] and Kendall [16] , see also Daniels [8], Moon and Pullman [19], Keener [15] and Laslier
[18]. For given digraph A this procedure is given by the sequence
x
t
= T
A
x
t 1
; t = 1; 2; : : : ; (1)
with x
0
= e with e
i
= 1 for i = 1; : : : ; n and T
A
the n  n adjacency matrix T
A
of the
digraph A with elements t
ij
= 1 if (i; j) 2 A and t
ij
= 0 otherwise. It follows that x
1
is
the score vector s
A
, x
2
is the vector giving for any node i the scores of all its successors
and so on. This iterative method is not guaranteed to converge to a reasonable solution.
For instance, when A is a transitive tournament, then x
t
converges to the zero vector and
so does not give a ranking. Only under severe restrictions the procedure converges to a
nonnegative solution. More precisely, let
e
A  A be the subset of digraphs such that for all
A 2
e
A it holds that for any i and j there exists a sequence i
1
; i
2
; : : : ; i
k
such that i
1
= i,
i
k
= j and (i
h
; i
h+1
) 2 A for all h = 1; : : : ; k   1. Such a digraph is called a league and
implies that each node is linked to any other node through a sequence of directed edges.
In particular it implies that each node is dominated by at least one other node and also
dominates at least one other node. We now have the following theorem, see Moon and
Pullman [19].
Theorem 2.3
For any A 2
e
A, the adjacency matrix T
A
has a unique positive eigenvalue 
A
. Moreover,
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the iterative system (1) converges to the unique eigenvector (up to normalization)MP(A) 2
IR
n
of T
A
with eigenvalue 
A
.
The theorem says that in case of a league the iterative process converges to the
unique solution (up to normalization) of the system of equations x = 
A
T
A
x with 
A
the
unique positive eigenvalue of T
A
, i.e. the Moon-Pullman power vector MP(A) satises
x
i
= 
A
X
j2S
A
i
x
j
; i 2 N; (2)
showing that the power of node i is equal to the unique positive eigenvalue of T
A
times
the total power of its successors. The fact that MP(A) is not dened when A 62
e
A limits
the usefulness of this power concept.
The next procedure, called the Markov procedure, has been proposed by Daniels [8]
and others, see Laslier [18], and is given by the iterative system
x
t
=
1
n  1
(T
A
+ S
A
)x
t 1
; t = 1; 2; : : : ; (3)
with x
0
= e and S
A
the n  n diagonal matrix with the score s
A
i
of node i on the i-th
place of the diagonal. When A is a tournament and thus the number of predecessors p
A
i
of
node i is equal to n  1  s
A
i
it holds that each column of the matrix M
A
=
1
n 1
(T
A
+S
A
)
sums up to one and therefore M
A
is a Markov transition matrix. It is well known from
the elementary theory of stochastic processes that for such a Markov matrix the iterative
process (3) has a unique limit point MA(A), being an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of the
matrix M
A
. So, MA(A) is a solution of the system x = M
A
x. In case p
A
i
> 0 it follows
that MA
i
(A) is given by
MA
i
(A) =
1
p
A
i
X
j2S
A
i
MA
j
(A); (4)
i.e. when p
A
i
> 0 the power of node i is equal to the total power of its successors divided
by its number of predecessors. However, the Markov power vector MA(A) is not dened
when A is not a tournament, which limits its usefulness.
The procedure proposed in Borm, van den Brink and Slikker [2] overcomes this
drawback. This iterated dominance vector is given by the system
x
t
=
b
T
A
x
t 1
; t = 1; 2; : : : ; (5)
with x
0
= e and
b
T
A
the modied adjacency matrix with elements
b
t
A
ij
=
1
p
A
j
+1
if (i; j) 2 A
or when j = i, and
b
t
ij
= 0 otherwise. So, using equation (5), we obtain for i = 1; : : : ; n
that x
t
i
=
P
j2S
A
i
[fig
x
t 1
j
1+p
A
j
, showing that after the rst iteration the vector according to the
modied dominance function is obtained. This equation also shows that for any A 2 A each
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column of the matrix
b
T
A
sums up to one and therefore
b
T
A
is a Markov transition matrix.
Hence, the iterative process (5) has a unique limit point BBS(A), being an eigenvector
with eigenvalue 1 of the matrix
b
T
A
. So, BBS(A) is a solution of the system x =
b
T
A
x.
Again, when p
A
i
> 0, it follows that BBS
i
(A) is given by
BBS
i
(A) =
1
p
A
i
X
j2S
A
i
p
A
i
+ 1
p
A
j
+ 1
BBS
j
(A); (6)
i.e. when p
A
i
> 0 the power of node i is equal to a weighted sum of the power of its
successors divided by its number of predecessors. Notice that this solution diers only
from the Markov solution with respect to the weights
p
A
i
+1
p
A
j
+1
of the powers of the nodes
j 2 S
A
i
. Nevertheless, it turns out that the power vector BBS(A) is also dened when A is
not a tournament.
Still, also this iterative procedure has some drawbacks. First, it should be noticed
that for both this process and the Markov process it holds that the procedure converges
to an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of the corresponding matrix, but that this eigenvector
does not need to be the unique (normalized) eigenvector with eigenvalue 1. Second, the
solution BBS(A) only discriminates between the nodes in top cycles (see footnote 1). Any
node not being in a top cycle gets value equal to zero, even when it dominates many other
nodes. For instance, let A be given by A = f(1; 2)g[f(2; j)j j = 3; : : : ; ng. Then A has one
top cycle, only containing node 1, and so BBS
1
(A) = n and BBS
j
(A) = 0 for j = 2; : : : ; n.
3
Given the fact that node 1 only dominates node 2 and node 2 dominates all other nodes
this outcome is not very satisfactory. Further, the solution does not satisfy the dummy
node property. In particular, an isolated node (being a top cycle on its own) gets value 1.
So, the outcome BBS(A) is useful when there is only a need to select a best alternative in
a social choice situation, the winner in a sports competition, or the strongest agent in an
organizational structure, but cannot be used to get a full ranking of all nodes.
3 The Positional Power of Nodes
The solutions to the iterative procedures can be seen as global power measures of the
nodes in the digraph. The systems of equations (2 ), (4) and (6) show that in all iterative
solutions, the power of a node depends in one way or another on the powers of its successors,
which on their turn depend on the power of their successors, and so on. So, according to
these measures, the power of a node depends on the powers of all other nodes within the
3
Observe that the sum of the components of BBS(A) equals n, because x
0
i
= 1 for all i. This also
reects the fact that in the modied dominance function each node distributes one unit of measure over
its predecessors, including the node itself.
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digraph, whereas the axiomatic power functions measure only the local power of a node.
The power function to be introduced in this section combines the direct local feature of
an axiomatic power function and the indirect global power measure of the iterated power
functions.
The idea of the new function is that the power of a node is determined by both the
number of its successors, as in the score measure, and the powers of its successors, as in
the Long path method. To be more precise, when node i dominates node j, then node i
gets a fraction
1
n
of the power of node j plus a xed amount
1
n
. Potentially the power of
node j plus a xed amount of 1 is distributed equally over all n nodes, but only the nodes
that dominate j get their part. So, the power x
i
of the node i in digraph A, A 2 A, is
dened by
x
i
=
X
j2S
A
i
(
1
n
x
j
+
1
n
); i 2 N: (7)
The next theorem shows that for every digraph A 2 A this system of equations has a
unique nonnegative solution. Notice that the system is not homogeneous, contrary to the
systems corresponding to the iterative procedures discussed in Section 2.
Theorem 3.1
For every digraph A, the system of equations (7) has a unique solution. Moreover, all
components of this solution are nonnegative.
Proof
Rewriting the system of equations (7) in matrix notation we obtain
(I  
1
n
T
A
)x =
1
n
s
A
; (8)
with I the identity matrix of appropriate dimension, T
A
the adjacency matrix of A and
s
A
the score vector of A. Let b
ij
be the (i; j) -th element of the matrix B
A
= I  
1
n
T
A
.
Since b
ii
= 1 for all i and b
ij
 0 for all i 6= j, according to Hawkins and Simon [12] the
inverse of B
A
exists and is nonnegative i there exists a nonnegative vector y 2 IR
n
such
that each component of z = B
A
y is positive. Take y = e; the vector with all components
equal to one. Then, z
i
=
P
n
j=1
b
ij
= 1  
P
fj 6=ijt
ij
=1g
1
n
 1  
n 1
n
> 0, where t
ij
is the
(i; j)-th element of the matrix T
A
. Hence, z is strictly positive and therefore the inverse
of B
A
exists and all elements of the inverse are nonnegative. Since also the vector s
A
is
nonnegative, it follows that system (8) has a unique nonnegative solution x
A
given by
x
A
=
1
n
(I  
1
n
T
A
)
 1
s
A
: (9)
Q.E.D.
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The solution of the system of equations (7) measures the power of the position of the nodes
within the digraph A. The positional power function is now dened as follows.
Denition 3.2 The positional power function is the function f
p
:A ! IR
n
which assigns
to every A 2 A the vector f
p
(A) =
1
n
(I  
1
n
T
A
)
 1
s
A
.
According to Theorem 3.1 the positional power function is well-dened and assigns a non-
negative power vector f
p
(A) to any digraph A 2 A. This overcomes the drawback of the
Moon-Pullman solution MP(A), which is restricted to the subclass
e
A of leagues, and the
drawback of the Markov solution MA(A), which is restricted to tournaments.
The positional power function satises several nice properties. First, f
p
satises the
dummy node property, i.e. f
p
i
(A) = 0 if S
A
i
= ;. Moreover, since x
A
is a nonnegative vector
it also follows immediately from the system of equations (7) that x
A
i
> 0 when S
A
i
6= ;,
implying that the positional power function assigns zero power to a node if and only if it
is a dummy node. So, the power function f
p
also overcomes the drawback of the iterative
dominance solution BBS(A), which assigns zero power to any node not in a top cycle on
the one hand and positive power to an isolated node on the other hand. From the system
of equations (7) it follows that f
p
i
(A)  f
p
j
(A) if S
A
j
 S
A
i
with strict inequality when S
A
j
is a proper subset of S
A
i
. This `monotonicity' property implies that f
p
satises the top
node property and is symmetric (in fact, any two nodes having the same set of successors
have the same power). When A is a tournament there is a unique top cycle and we have
that S
A
j
 S
A
i
nfjg and thus f
p
i
(A) > f
p
j
(A) for any i in the top cycle and any j not in the
top cycle. So, when applying the positional power function to select a best alternative in a
social choice problem, the function selects an alternative from the top cycle. Summarizing,
we have the following properties.
Corollary 3.3
The positional power function f
p
:A! IR
n
+
satises for any A 2 A the following properties.
 For every node i 2 N it holds that f
p
i
(A) > 0 if and only if S
A
i
6= ;.
 For every pair of nodes i; j 2 N it holds that f
p
j
(A)  f
p
i
(A) if S
A
i
 S
A
j
with equality
only when S
A
i
= S
A
j
.
 When A is a tournament, f
p
i
(A) > f
p
j
(A) for any i in the top cycle and any j not in the
top cycle.
Before discussing more properties of f
p
we derive the following lemma about the inverse
matrix (I  
1
n
T
A
)
 1
. In the sequel we denote this matrix by V
A
, with (i; j)-th element
equal to v
ij
.
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Lemma 3.4
For any pair i; j = 1; : : : ; n, the elements v
ij
of V
A
have the following properties.
(i) v
ii
= 1 +
P
h2P
A
i
v
ih
=n and v
ij
=
P
h2P
A
j
v
ih
=n for j 6= i.
(ii)
P
n
j=1
(n  s
A
j
)v
ij
= n.
(iii) 1  v
ii
 2n=(n+ 1) and 0  v
ij
 n=(n + 1) for j 6= i.
(iv) v
ij
= 0 for j 6= i (v
ii
= 1) if and only if there does not exists an ordered path of arcs
from node i to node j (node i).
Proof
Since V
A
(I  
1
n
T
A
) = I; we nd by rearranging terms that V
A
= I +
1
n
V
A
T
A
. Recalling
that the (h; j)-th element t
hj
of the matrix T
A
is equal to 1 if h 2 P
A
j
and 0 otherwise, we
obtain property (i). Postmultiplying both sides of the equality V
A
(I  
1
n
T
A
) = I by the
vector e, we obtain for any i = 1; : : : ; n
n
X
j=1
v
ij
= 1 +
n
X
j=1
X
h2P
A
j
v
ih
=n = 1 +
n
X
h=1
X
j2S
A
h
v
ih
=n = 1 +
n
X
h=1
s
A
h
v
ih
=n;
which, by rearranging terms, yields property (ii). From the proof of Theorem 3.1 we already
know that v
ij
 0 for all j 6= i and thus from property (i) it follows that v
ii
 1 for all
i = 1; : : : ; n. Since s
A
h
 n  1 for all h, it follows from property (ii) that
n
X
h=1
v
ih

n
X
h=1
(n  s
A
h
)v
ih
= n:
Hence, for j 6= i, from property (i) we obtain
v
ij
=
X
h2P
A
j
v
ih
=n 
n
X
h=1
v
ih
=n  v
ij
=n  1  v
ij
=n;
because j =2 P
A
j
. This shows that v
ij
 n=(n + 1) for j 6= i. Similarly, we obtain
v
ii
 1 +
n
X
h=1
v
ih
=n  v
ii
=n  2  v
ii
=n:
To prove property (iv), notice that since all t
ij
 0; t
ii
= 0 and
P
j 6=i
1
n
t
ij
< 1, we have that
the inverse matrix V
A
can be written as
V
A
= I +
1
X
k=1
1
n
k
(T
A
)
k
(10)
with (T
A
)
k
the product of k matrices T
A
. Clearly, ((T
A
)
k
)
ij
> 0 if and only if there exists
at least one ordered path of adjacent arcs of length k from node i to node j. This implies
11
that if there is no path at all from node i to node j we must have that v
ii
= 1 and v
ij
= 0
when j 6= i; and conversely. Q.E.D.
The next result follows easily from the previous lemma.
Lemma 3.5
For any A 2 A it holds that f
p
(A) = (V
A
  I)e.
Proof
From equation (9) it follows that f
p
(A) =
1
n
V
A
s
A
and thus
f
p
i
(A) =
n
X
j=1
s
A
j
v
ij
=n; i = 1; : : : ; n:
From property (ii) of Lemma 3.4 we obtain
f
p
i
(A) =
n
X
j=1
v
ij
  1; i = 1; : : : ; n;
which proves the lemma. Q.E.D.
Since equation (10) shows that V
A
  I =
P
1
k=1
1
n
k
(T
A
)
k
it follows from Lemma 3.5 that
f
p
(A) = (
P
1
k=1
1
n
k
(T
A
)
k
)e and thus that for any starting vector x
0
, the power vector f
p
(A)
is the limit point of the iterative process
x
t
=
1
n
T
A
(x
t 1
+ e); t = 1; 2; : : : : (11)
Taking as starting vector x
0
= 0, we obtain that x
1
=
1
n
s
A
, i.e. the rst iteration gives a
(normalized) score vector, which corresponds to the rst iteration of the Long path method.
However, any next iteration diers because of the xed term
1
n
T
A
e, giving to a node i a
fraction
1
n
of the current power of its successors plus the xed amount
1
n
for each of its
its successors. For any i; j = 1; : : : ; n, the nonnegative number
1
n
k
((T
A
)
k
)
ij
, k 2 IN, is
precisely the contribution of node j to the power of node i over all ordered paths of length
k in A leading from node i to node j. Remark that a path may contain several cycles and
contain a cycle more than once. Adding up all these contributions over k 2 IN yields the
total contribution v
ij
of node j to the power of node i 6= j (respectively v
ii
 1 when i = j).
Adding up all these total contributions over j yields the positional power of node i in the
digraph A. Recall from property (iv) of Lemma 3.4 that v
ij
(v
ii
  1 if i = j) is positive if
and only if there exists at least one ordered path from node i to node j.
The next lemma shows that the positional power function is increasing in A and
that adding an arc from h to k increases the power of node h more than the power of any
other node.
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Lemma 3.6
Let A and A
0
be two digraphs such that A
0
= A [ f(h; k)g for some (h; k) not in A. Then
the following properties hold for f
p
(A) and f
p
(A
0
).
(i) For any i = 1; : : : ; n, f
p
i
(A
0
)  f
p
i
(A).
(ii) f
p
h
(A
0
)  f
p
h
(A) > max
i2Nnfhg
f
p
i
(A
0
)  f
p
i
(A).
(iii) For every i 6= h, f
p
i
(A
0
) = f
p
i
(A) if and only if there is no ordered path of any length
in A from node i to node h.
Proof
Let E
h;k
= T
A
0
 T
A
, so element (i; j) of the matrix E
h;k
is equal to 1 for (i; j) = (h; k) and
equal to zero otherwise. Let x
A
= x
A
0
 x
A
. Since (I 
1
n
T
A
)x
A
=
s
A
n
, (I 
1
n
T
A
0
)x
A
0
=
s
A
0
n
and s
A
0
= s
A
+ e
h
, where e
h
is the h-th unit vector in IR
n
, by subtracting the rst equality
from the second one we obtain that
(I  
1
n
T
A
0
)x
A
 
1
n
E
h;k
x
A
=
e
h
n
and so
(I  
1
n
T
A
0
)x
A
=
1
n
E
h;k
x
A
+
e
h
n
= (
x
A
k
n
+
1
n
)e
h
:
Therefore,
x
A
= cV
A
0
e
h
;
where c =
1
n
(x
A
k
+ 1). From the proof of Theorem 3.1 it follows that V
A
0
is a nonnegative
matrix. Since c is a positive number and e
h
is a nonnegative vector, it follows that x
A
is
a (nonzero) nonnegative vector, which proves property (i). From x
A
= cV
A
0
e
h
it follows
that for i = 1; : : : ; n,
x
A
i
= cv
0
ih
;
where v
0
ih
is the (i; h)-th element of the matrix V
A
0
. Applying property (iii) of Lemma 3.4
to V
A
0
we obtain for i 6= h
x
A
h
= cv
0
hh
 c > cv
0
ih
= x
A
i
;
which proves property (ii). Finally, when A does not contain an ordered path from node
i 6= h to node h, then also A
0
does not contain such a path. So, according to property
(iv) of Lemma 3.4 applied to V
A
0
we have that v
0
ih
= 0 and thus x
A
i
= 0, which proves
property (iii). Q.E.D.
Finally, let us consider the total positional power being assigned to the nodes in a
digraph A. The total positional power of a digraph A,
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A), can be interpreted as a
measure of the total amount of power being exercised by the nodes of the digraph A.
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Lemma 3.7
The following properties hold for the total power assigned by the positional power function.
(i)
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A) = e
>
V
A
e  n:
(ii) jAj=n 
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A)  jAj:
(iii)
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A) = 0 if A is the empty digraph, while
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A) = n(n  1) in case A is
complete.
Proof
Clearly, from Lemma 3.5 it follows that
n
X
i=1
f
p
i
(A) = e
>
(V
A
  I)e = e
>
V
A
e  n;
which shows property (i). By the system of equations (7),
n
X
i=1
f
p
i
(A) =
n
X
i=1
X
j2S
A
i
(
1
n
f
p
j
(A) +
1
n
) =
n
X
j=1
p
A
j
n
f
p
j
(A) + jAj=n;
which implies immediately that
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A)  jAj=n: Rearranging terms gives
P
n
i=1
(n  
p
A
i
)f
p
i
(A) = jAj; from which it follows that
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A)  jAj; thereby showing property (ii).
Since p
A
j
= 0 and jAj = 0 in case of the empty digraph and p
A
j
= n  1 and jAj = n(n  1)
in case of the complete digraph,
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A) = 0 if A is the empty digraph, while in case
A is complete
n
X
i=1
f
p
i
(A) = n  1 +
n
X
i=1
n  1
n
f
p
i
(A)
and thus
P
n
i=1
f
p
i
(A) = n(n  1), which proves property (iii). Q.E.D.
The Lemma's 3.6 and 3.7 show that the total positional power of the nodes in a
graph is strictly increasing in A and lies between jAj=n and jAj. It should be noticed
that, although the total positional power is increasing in A, it is not like the score function
(strictly) increasing in the number of arcs. Observe that the total positional power is equal
to the number of arcs when A is either the empty or the complete digraph. In both cases
the positional power vector is equal to the score vector.
4 The Positional Weakness and the Net Power of a
Node
While the score function f
s
assigns to a node its number of successors (wins), f
s
i
(A) = s
A
i
,
the Copeland score function, denoted by f
C
, is given by its number of successors (wins)
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minus its number of predecessors (losses), i.e. f
C
i
(A) = s
A
i
 p
A
i
, i = 1; : : : ; n. The function
which assigns to every node i the number of predecessors, p
A
i
, can be seen as a measure of
the (local) weakness of node i within the digraph A, while the score function is a measure for
the (local) strength or power of node i within A. The Copeland score of a node is therefore
the dierence between the power and the weakness and measures the local net power of
the node within the digraph, without taking into account how strong the successors or
how weak the predecessors are. For the positional power function dened in the previous
section we can also dene its counterpart, which we call the positional weakness function.
Denition 4.1 The positional weakness function is the function f
w
:A ! IR
n
+
which as-
signs to every A 2 A the vector f
w
(A) = y
A
, where y
A
is the solution of the system of
equations given by
y
i
=
X
j2P
A
i
(
1
n
y
j
+
1
n
); i 2 N: (12)
Notice that the positional weakness vector of a digraph is equal to the positional power
vector of its transpose, where for a digraph A 2 A the transpose A
>
is obtained from A
by taking the reverse of all arcs, i.e.
A
>
= f(i; j) 2 N N j (j; i) 2 Ag:
The positional weakness function measures the weakness of the position of the nodes within
a digraph, taking into account the weakness of the predecessors. Similar to the positional
power function, the positional weakness function is well dened. Obviously, results analo-
gous to the ones of Section 3 can be shown for the positional weakness function, for instance
that it assigns to every digraph a nonnegative vector, f
w
i
(A) > 0 if and only if P
A
i
6= ;,
f
w
j
(A)  f
w
i
(A) if P
A
i
 P
A
j
, and the positional weakness vector increases in A. The
dierence between the positional power and the positional weakness of a node measures
the net power of that node within the digraph.
Denition 4.2 The net power function is the function P :A! IR
n
which assigns to every
A 2 A the vector P (A) = f
p
(A)  f
w
(A).
A positive net power of a node means that the node exercises more power than it suers
from weakness, while a negative net power means the opposite. The net power function
can also be used to rank the nodes. The node with the highest net power is the strongest
node in the digraph, while the node with the lowest net power is the weakest node. The
next lemma shows that the sum of all net powers of the nodes is always equal to zero.
Lemma 4.3
For any digraph A 2 A it holds that
P
n
i=1
P
i
(A) = 0.
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Proof
Since T
A
>
= (T
A
)
>
, we have that V
A
>
= (I  
1
n
T
A
>
)
 1
= (V
A
)
>
. Since f
w
(A) = f
p
(A
>
)
and f
p
(A) = (V
A
 I)e, we obtain f
w
(A) = ((V
A
)
>
 I)e. Hence, P (A) = f
p
(A) f
w
(A) =
(V
A
  (V
A
)
>
)e, and thus
P
n
i=1
P
i
(A) = e
>
(V
A
  (V
A
)
>
)e = 0. Q.E.D.
The property that the total power in any digraph is equal to the total power in its transpose
digraph also holds for the score function, but not for the dominance function. According
to the score function the total power (score) is equal to the number of arcs and hence equal
in both digraphs. However, the total power in the dominance function is equal to the total
number of dominated nodes, which does not need to be equal in A and its transpose A
>
.
4
5 Some Further Extensions
In this section we consider some extensions of the positional power function. First, we can
extend the concept of positional power function to a class of power functions by generalizing
the system of equations (7) to the system
x
i
=
X
j2S
A
i
(
1
k
x
j
+ c); i 2 N; (13)
for any given c > 0 and k  n   1. For k < n   1 the inverse of the matrix I  
1
k
T may
not exist or contain negative elements, so that the solution x
A
cannot be guaranteed to
be unique or nonnegative. When k = n   1 the inverse matrix exists and is nonnegative
for any A, except when A is complete, in which case the matrix is singular.
5
Hence, it is
reasonable to restrict the values of k to k > n  1: In these cases Theorem 3.1 applies and
the solution of the corresponding system of equations (7) is given by
e
x
A
= c(I  
1
k
T
A
)
 1
s
A
: (14)
From this equation it can be seen that the number c only determines the absolute value of
the solution, but not the relative powers or the ranking of the nodes. When A is not empty
and thus at least one node has positive power, the constant c can be used to normalize the
sum of the powers to one, which in some applications may be useful. This is achieved by
setting c equal to c
A
; where
c
A
= (e
>
(I  
1
k
T
A
)
 1
s
A
)
 1
:
4
For the modied dominance function the total power is always equal to the number of nodes and thus
independent of the arcs in the digraph.
5
Although one could argue that in a complete digraph the power of every node is innite.
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For example, the normalized positional power function can be used to determine whether
a collection of nonempty digraphs is balanced, see Herings, van der Laan, and Talman
(2000). Given the normalized positional power function, denoted by f
n;p
, a collection
fA
i
2 A j i 2 I
k
g of (nonempty) digraphs is said to be balanced if the system
k
X
i=1

i
f
n;p
(A
i
) =
1
n
e
has a nonnegative solution. Balancedness of digraphs can be used to give suÆcient con-
ditions for the nonemptiness of the core as solution concept for a nontransferable utility
game in graph structure.
From
P
n
i=1
e
x
A
i
= cjAj +
P
n
i=1
p
A
i
k
e
x
A
i
it follows that when A is the complete digraph,
and thus p
A
= (n  1)e; the sum of the powers is equal to
n
X
i=1
e
x
A
i
= c
kn(n  1)
k   n+ 1
;
which goes to innity when k goes to n 1, reecting that the inverse matrix does not exist
in case k = n 1 and A is complete. On the other hand,
kn(n 1)
k n+1
converges to jAj = n(n 1)
when k goes to innity. The latter reects the fact that up to normalization the generalized
positional power function converges to the score function when k goes to innity. So, the
score function can be considered to be the limit case of the class of power functions dened
in the system of equations (14).
Above we assumed that every arc in a digraph has equal weight. In case arcs have
dierent weights it is easy to adapt the positional power function accordingly. If w
ij
is the
(nonnegative) weight of arc (i; j) in digraph A, then we may consider the system
x
i
=
X
j2S
A
i
(
w
ij
k
x
j
+
w
ij
k
); i 2 N; (15)
with k equal to (max
i;j
w
ij
)n. Notice that we allow weights to be larger than one. This
might occur for example in a competition where the teams (nodes) play against each other
more than once or when a win yields extra points, e.g. one point in case of a draw and
three points for a win and zero points for a loss.
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